United Nations
Security Council
S/1994/674 - 27 May 1994 (continued)
- SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS
- Detention facilities
- Bosnian Government camps
- Bosnian-Croat, Croatian Defence Council,
Croatian Government and Croatian Army camps
- ``Bosnian Serb Republic'' camps
- Rape and other forms of sexual assault
- Rape and sexual assault study: the
Commission's database
- Pilot study on rape
- Rape and other forms of sexual assault:
interviewing victims and witnesses
- Mass graves
- Investigation of grave sites at Ovcara near
Vukovar (UNPA, Sector East, Croatia)
- Investigation of grave sites near Pakracka Poljana
(UNPA, Sector West, Croatia)
- Destruction of cultural property
- Dubrovnik investigation
- Radiological investigation (UNPA, Sector West)
- GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the spring of 1992, the warring factions to the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia operated a variety of detention
facilities (camps) throughout the former Yugoslavia.
The Commission received information concerning a total of
715 camps, most of which are now closed. The Commission's
information about the exact date of opening and closing of these
camps and the number of prisoners is incomplete. *56
Of the 715 camps: 237 were operated by Bosnian Serbs and
the former Republic of Yugoslavia; 89 were operated by the
Government and army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 77 were operated by
Bosnian Croats, the Government of Croatia, the Croatian Army and
the Croatian Defence Council; 4 were operated
jointly by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats; and 308 camps
for which it is not known with certainty under whose effective
control they were.
The camps range in size from small detention centres that
temporarily house a few prisoners to camps that house large numbers
of prisoners. The duration of their operation varies from days to
months. The purposes of the camps vary as well.
Owing to the nature of the several conflicts and the
military structure of the warring factions (see paras. 110 -
128 and annex III), the control of camps varies. At different points in
time, the same camp may be controlled by the army, the central
Government, local and political authorities, the police, various
military groups and local armed civilians.
The various groups identified above converted pre-existing
structures, such as municipal buildings, administrative offices,
schools, sports arenas within the occupied areas and larger
facilities on the outskirts of those areas (factories, warehouses,
quarries and mines), into camps. Using these pre-existing
facilities allows for quick and easy control and displacement of
the targeted population of a controlled or conquered
geographic region by one of the warring factions. There is no
particular distinction between facilities holding prisoners of war
and non-combatant civilians.
The camps are frequently used to detain the civilian
population that has been forcibly displaced from particular
regions. Detention either
precedes or follows armed engagements in these regions. Wholesale
detention of persons from another ethnic or religious group occurs
even when there is nothing to suggest that internment of civilians
is necessary for any valid legal purpose (see paras. 129 -
150 and annex III).
Camps are frequently the reported sites of mass executions,
torture, rapes and other forms of sexual assault. They are the scene of the
worst inhumane acts. These inhumane acts are committed by guards,
police, special forces, and others who are allowed to come from the
outside to perform such acts.
As the following discussion indicates, the number of camps
and the number of reported violations in camps controlled by the Government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its army are by far the lesser of the
warring factions, irrespective of the ethnic or religious
background of the detainees they hold. The number of reported
violations by the Croatian Government, the Croatian Army and the
Croatian Defence Council is larger, particularly against Serbs in
Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia and against
Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Herzegovina. The period of
time during which those camps were operated in each of these
contexts is relatively limited. The two warring factions
identified above are however reported to have a much lesser number
of violations than those committed by the Serb forces and those
working on their behalf, whether in Croatia or
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Camps operated by Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina are by far the ones where the largest numbers of
detainees have been held and where the cruellest and largest number
of violations occurred.
The characteristics and patterns of violation in the camps
differ widely depending on the controlling authority, the purpose
of the camp and the camp commander.
Following is a summary description of camps divided by
warring factions in control. *57
The Commission has information that Bosnian Serbs are
operating camps where grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
other violations of international humanitarian law, including
killing, torture and rape reportedly occur on a large scale. These
camps are mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and hold Bosnian Muslims
for the most part, but also Bosnian Croats. The Bosnian Serbs use
camps to facilitate territorial and political
control of a geographic region and to expel and eliminate other
ethnic and religious populations from that area. The Commission
has detailed information concerning some of the locations and
physical layouts of some of these camps, including descriptions of
the various buildings where prisoners are detained, interrogated,
tortured and killed. The Commission also has
information about some camp commanders and military units in the
areas and individual violators.
The following patterns have reportedly emerged from these
camps:
- Camps are ultimately intended to achieve ``ethnic cleansing''
(see paras. 129 -
150 and 151 -
182 and annex V);
- Groups of camps are established and operated in clusters in
various geographical areas and are frequently part of a network.
Prisoners are frequently moved from one facility to another. Different
facilities often have separate specific purposes like mass killing,
torture, rape and exchange and holding of civilian prisoners;
- Detainees are sometimes transported from camps within a
given region to camps in another region because of overcrowding, anticipated
ICRC inspection, visits by the media, exchange of prisoners and as
a result of triage for unlawful purposes;
- Purposeful humiliation and degradation of prisoners is a
common feature in almost all camps;
- After a village, town or city is conquered, the local
population is rounded up en masse and interned in different
locations. During the rounding-up process, members of the
population are frequently tortured, raped and killed. Local
religious, political, civic, professional, business leaders and
prominent personalities are singled out for the worst abuses. On
the captors' side, local civil servants, political leaders and
particularly the police participate or are involved in the
rounding-up process;
- Prisoners are forced to surrender their money and valuables
to their captors and, if released, these valuables are not
returned;
- In most instances, captors interrogate prisoners for
information about military and strategic information, political
affiliation and political belief. Captors also interrogate
detainees concerning the personal wealth and family connections of
other detainees. Most of the time, the questioning is unrelated to
military or security matters. Almost always, interrogation is
accompanied by brutality and humiliation and, in many cases, by
torture and murder;
- The smaller camps house the population temporarily until
the captors divide the prisoners into smaller groups and transport
them to larger camps or to separate sections of large camps. When
prisoners are transported to larger camps, they are often packed
tightly into buses, lorries or freight
and cattle trains and are subjected to physical and mental abuse.
While being transported, prisoners are often killed at random and
are denied food, water and access to toilet facilities. When the
buses or freight cars reach their destinations, while the prisoners
are unloaded, several prisoners are often killed. Sometimes
prisoners are transported by car to camps by locals;
- Men between the ages of 16 (or younger) and 60, who are
considered to be of military age, are usually separated from older
men, women and children. These men are transferred to heavily
guarded larger camps where killings and brutal torture are
prevalent;
- At the larger camps, prisoners are subjected to random
beatings. Many prisoners are beaten under the guise of being
interrogated. Beatings, more severe torture and killings escalate
when there has been a Bosnian-Serb military setback and when there
are Serb casualties;
- Prisoners who are targeted for torture or death at the
larger camps
include prominent members of the community who are wealthy,
educated or politically influential persons in the community.
Guards usually have information identifying which prisoners fall
into these categories. They obtain that information from their own
local population, through coercion and
violence from other prisoners or from other detention facilities
that are used solely to interrogate displaced populations;
- In several instances, prisoners have been forced to inflict
injury on each other, sometimes as entertainment for the guards.
In other instances, prisoners are mass executed by machine-gun fire;
- In most camps (particularly during the second half of 1992
and the first half of 1993), prisoners are killed on a daily basis.
Their bodies are sometimes left to rot on camp grounds, disposed of
in mass graves abutting the camps and thrown into rivers, ravines,
mine shafts and mining pits. The
Commission has some information concerning the locations of many of
these mass graves (see paras. 253 -
263 and annexes X, X.A and X.B);
- Women, children and men over 60 years of age are usually
separated from others and taken to separate camps. These camps are
guarded and surrounded by fences, but prisoners are usually allowed
to walk from building
to building within the camp compound. Although fewer killings
occur at these camps, torture and particularly rape are
commonplace;
- Rape is prevalent in the camps (see paras. 231 -
252 and
annexes IX and IX.A). Captors have killed women who resisted being
raped, often in front of other prisoners. Rapes were also
committed in the presence of other
prisoners. Women are frequently selected at random during the
night. These rapes are done in a way that instills terror in the
women prisoner population. The Commission has information
indicating that girls as young as 7 years old and women as old as
65 have been raped while in captivity. *58
The group most targeted
for rape, however, is young women between the ages of 13 and 35.
Mothers of young children are often raped in front of their
children and are threatened with the death of their children if
they do not submit to being raped. Sometimes young women are
separated from older women and taken to separate camps where they
are raped several times a day, for many days, often by more than
one man. Many of these women disappear, or after they have been
raped and brutalized to the point where they are traumatized, they
are returned to the camps and are replaced by other young
women. There have also been instances of sexual abuse of men as
well as castration and mutilation of male sexual organs;
- Prisoners in all camps are subjected to mental abuse and
humiliation, including barrages of ethnic slurs. Prisoners are
detained in unsanitary environments where dysentery and lice
epidemics are rampant. Prisoners are
often denied the use of toilet facilities. Often, male prisoners
of fighting age are packed so tightly in the prison facilities that
they do not have room to lie down or sit, or sometimes even to
breathe. In addition, prisoners are nearly starved to death and,
at best, are given one meal a day consisting of meagre portions of
thin soup and bread. In instances where food is delivered
to a camp by the ICRC, the food is not distributed to prisoners as
intended. Instead, food is retained for the Bosnian-Serb fighting
forces or is consumed by the camp guards. Furthermore, medical
attention is, for the most part, non-existent at the camps, and
often sick and wounded prisoners are buried alive in mass graves
along with the corpses of killed prisoners.
The Commission concludes that grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law
have been committed over a long period of time, on a large scale,
and very frequently in the most brutal, inhuman and degrading
manner. These violations are
ordered by or known to the camp commanders, the local political
leadership and police. Army units may or may not be involved.
However, they do not intervene to stop these violations, thereby
implying responsibility by omission.
Throughout the various phases of the armed conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia, there have been numerous reports of widespread
and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault. The
Commission, concerned about
these reported crimes, undertook several means of research and
investigation to ascertain the facts.
The Commission sought particularly to examine the
relationship between ``ethnic cleansing'' and rape and other forms of
sexual assault.
Owing to the social stigma attached - even in times of
peace - rape is among the least reported crimes. For this reason,
it is very difficult to make any general assessment of actual
numbers of rape victims. In the former Yugoslavia, there appears
to have been very little, if any, difference between the ethnic
groups in the reluctance to report rape. The overall reluctance to
report rape is aggravated by war, especially if the
perpetrators are soldiers and also where there is a general
condition of chaos and a breakdown in law and order. The victims
may have little confidence in finding justice. The strong fear of
reprisal during wartime adds to the silencing of victims. *60 The
perpetrators have a strong belief that they can get away with their
crimes.
Men are also subject to sexual assault. They are forced to
rape women and to perform sex acts on guards or each other. They
have also been subjected to castration, circumcision or other
sexual mutilation.
The reports contained in the Commission's database identify
close to 800 victims by name or number. *62 An additional 1,673
victims are referred to, but not named in reports of victims who
indicate that they have witnessed or know of other similar victims.
Additionally, there are some 500 reported cases which refer to an
unspecified number of victims. The victims' ages, as
reported, range from 5 to 81 years old, with the majority of
victims below 35 years old. The reported cases identify some 600
alleged perpetrators by name. In other cases, victims refer to a
specific number of perpetrators, but do not identify them by name.
In those cases of unidentified perpetrators, about 900 perpetrators
are referred to. Of all the reports received, about
800 contain general information, identifying some perpetrators as
soldiers, police, paramilitary, special forces, etc. The alleged
perpetrators include military personnel, special forces, local
police and civilians. About 80 per cent of the reported cases
specify that they occurred in settings where the victims were held
in custody.
The reported cases of rape and sexual assault contained in
the database occurred between the fall of 1991 and the end of 1993.
The majority of the rapes occurred from April to November 1992;
fewer occurred in the following five months. In the same time
period, the number of media reports
increased from a few in March 1992 to a high of 535 news stories in
January 1993 and 529 in February 1993. This correlation could
indicate that the media attention caused the decline. In that
case, it would indicate that commanders could control the alleged
perpetrators if they wanted to. *63 This could lead to the
conclusion that there was an overriding policy
advocating the use of rape as a method of ``ethnic cleansing'',
rather than a policy of omission, tolerating the widespread
commission of rape.
A series of interviews was carried out by the Commission in
Croatia and Slovenia in March 1994. *65 Among the 146 victim-
witnesses from Bosnia and Herzegovina who were interviewed, 31 were
women victims of rape, and two
were suspected by the interviewer to have been victims themselves
but were unwilling to speak of their own experience. One of the
men from Bosnia and Herzegovina interviewed was a victim of sexual
assault. This occurred in a detention facility. Among the women,
18 *66 were raped in their own homes, while 13 had been raped while
in detention. Among the other men and women interviewed, there
were 21 witnesses to additional cases of rape or sexual
assaults. *67 This involves a total number of 55 persons who were
either the victims of or witnesses to rape or sexual assault.
Among the 77 victim-witnesses from Croatia who were
interviewed, 11 were women victims of rape. Six of the men from
Croatia who were interviewed
were victims of sexual assault. In the case of the men, all but
one of these violations occurred in a detention context. However,
seven of the women had been raped in their own homes. These women
were victims of multiple and/or gang rapes involving up to eight
soldiers. Four women were raped while in detention, among them was
a woman who was detained in her own home for six months and raped
almost daily. Among the other men and women interviewed
from Croatia, nine were witnesses to additional cases of rape or
sexual assault. This involves a total number of 27 persons who
were either the victims of or witnesses to rape or sexual assault.
All of the information gathered through the 223 interviews,
*68 that were conducted by the Commission has been made available
to the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. There has been
insufficient time between the end of the interview process (31
March 1994) and the finalization of the present report (30 April
1994) for a detailed analysis of the cases to be conducted
by the Commission. *69 However, the information gathered seems to
support the analysis carried out on the basis of the allegations
included in the Commission's database. In the following
paragraphs, the patterns of rape and sexual assault identified
through the database are outlined, while illustrations are given
which are drawn from among the interviews.
Five patterns *70 emerge from the reported cases,
regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims (see
also para. 229 for a description of rape practices in custodial
settings).
The first pattern involves individuals or small groups
committing sexual assault in conjunction with looting and
intimidation of the target
ethnic group. This is before any widespread or generalized
fighting breaks out in the region. Tensions in an area grow and
members of the ethnic group controlling the regional government
begin to terrorize their neighbours. Two or more men break into a
house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them
and often rape the females. Some of the reported rapes are
singular and some multiple. In either case, there is often a gang
atmosphere where the abuses are part of the same event and all the
attackers participate, even if they do not sexually assault the
victims. One of the women interviewed was gang-raped by eight
soldiers in front of her six-year-old sister and her five-month-old
daughter. One of the men was forced at gunpoint to rape the
victim, ``as she was an Ustasha''. When she reported the crimes to
local authorities, they said they could do nothing as
``she was a Croat''.
The second pattern of rape involves individuals or small
groups committing sexual assaults in conjunction with fighting in
an area, often including the rape of women in public. When forces
attack a town or village, the population is rounded up and divided
by sex and age. Some women are
raped in their homes as the attacking forces secure the area.
Others are selected after the roundup and raped publicly. The
population of the village is then transported to camps. One
victim-witness interviewed saw an elderly woman and others raped in
front of a group of 100 detained villagers. The witness was
herself threatened with rape and she saw a number of men from the
group having their throats cut.
The third pattern of rape involves individuals or groups
sexually assaulting people in detention because they have access to
the people. Once the population of a town or village has been
rounded up, men are either executed or sent off to camps, while
women are generally sent off to separate
camps. Soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries and even civilians may
be allowed to enter the camp, pick out women, take them away, rape
them and then either kill them or return them to the site. Reports
frequently refer to gang rape, while beatings and torture accompany
most of the reported rapes. Survivors report that some women are
taken out alone, and some are taken out in groups. Though this is
the general pattern, there are also many
allegations that women are raped in front of other internees, or
that other internees are forced to sexually abuse each other. In
camps where men are detained, they are also subjected to sexual
abuse. During the Commission's interviewing process 15 people were
interviewed whose major allegations
related to the same detention camp. Some witnesses were men, and
all of the women victims had been raped. The women were sometimes
gang raped by, or in the presence of, the camp commander. Guards
from the external ring of security around the camp (who apparently
did not enter the camp in the course of their work) and soldiers
who were strangers to the camp would be allowed
access to the camp for rape. One of the victim-witnesses
interviewed saw a woman die after being in a coma for a week as a
result of about 100 sadistic rapes by guards. Sexual assaults were
also practised against men: one witness saw prisoners forced to
bite another prisoner's genitals. In addition, 10 of those
interviewed had witnessed deaths by torture and seven of the group
had survived or witnessed mass executions (there or in other
camps). Another incident related in an interview involved
prisoners lined up naked while Serb women from outside undressed in
front of the male prisoners. If any prisoner had an erection, his
penis was cut off. The witness saw a named Serb woman thus
castrate a prisoner. Another ex-detainee told of suffering
electric shocks to the scrotum and of seeing a father and son who
shared his cell forced by guards to perform sex acts with each
other.
The fourth pattern of rape involves individuals or groups
committing sexual assaults against women for the purpose of
terrorizing and humiliating them often as part of the policy of
``ethnic cleansing''. Survivors of some camps report that they
believe they were detained for the purpose of rape. In those
camps, all of the women are raped quite frequently, often in front
of other internees, and usually accompanied by beatings and
torture. Some captors also state that they are trying to
impregnate the women. Pregnant women are detained until it is too
late for them to obtain an abortion. One woman was detained by her
neighbour (who was a soldier) near her village for six months. She
was raped almost daily by three or four soldiers. She was told
that she would give birth to a chetnik boy who would kill Muslims
when he grew up. They repeatedly said their President had ordered them
to do this. One woman's home was taken by Serbian neighbours and
used as a detention centre for interrogations over several months.
She was raped almost daily and beaten for several months; two other
women were raped there too. She saw several killings and torture.
The fifth pattern of rape involves detention of women in
hotels or similar facilities for the sole purpose of sexually
entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in the women.
These women are reportedly more often killed than exchanged, unlike
women in other camps. One woman interviewed was detained in a
private house with a number of other women for six months. The
women were of mixed ethnicity. All the women were raped
when soldiers returned from the front line every 15 days. The
witness was told that the women had to do this because the women in
another camp (which the witness named and which has been documented
by other information gatherers) were exhausted.
Common threads run through the cases reported whether
within or outside of a detention context:
- Rapes seem to occur in conjunction with efforts to displace
the targeted ethnic group from the region. This may involve
heightened shame and humiliation by raping victims in front of
adult and minor family members, in
front of other detainees or in public places, or by forcing family
members to rape each other. Young women and virgins are targeted
for rape, along with prominent members of the community and
educated women;
- Many reports state that perpetrators said they were ordered
to rape, or that the aim was to ensure that the victims and their
families would never want to return to the area. Perpetrators tell
female victims that they will bear children of the perpetrator's
ethnicity, that they must become pregnant, and then hold them in
custody until it is too late for the victims to get an
abortion. Victims are threatened that if they ever tell anyone, or
anyone discovers what has happened, the perpetrators will hunt them
down and kill them;
- Large groups of perpetrators subject victims to multiple
rapes and sexual assault. In detention, perpetrators go through
the detention centres
with flashlights at night selecting women and return them the next
morning, while camp commanders often know about, and sometimes
participate in, the sexual assaults;
- Victims may be sexually abused with foreign objects like
broken glass bottles, guns and truncheons. Castrations are
performed through crude means
such as forcing other internees to bite off a prisoner's testicles.
Rape has been reported to have been committed by all sides
to the conflict. However, the largest number of reported victims
have been Bosnian Muslims, and the largest number of alleged
perpetrators have been Bosnian Serbs. There are few reports of
rape and sexual assault between members of the same ethnic group.
In Bosnia, some of the reported rape and sexual assault
cases committed by Serbs, mostly against Muslims, are clearly the
result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of
command direction or an overall policy. However, many more seem to
be a part of an overall pattern
whose characteristics include: similarities among practices in
non-contiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other
international humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military
activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations;
common elements in the commission of rape, maximizing shame and
humiliation to not only the victim, but also the victim's
community; and the timing of rapes. One factor
in particular that leads to this conclusion is the large number of
rapes which occurred in places of detention. *71 These rapes in
detention do not appear to be random, and they indicate at least a
policy of encouraging rape supported by the deliberate failure of
camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and
control over the personnel under their authority.
These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape
policy existed in certain areas, but it remains to be proven
whether such an overall policy existed which was to apply to all
non-Serbs. It is clear that some level of organization and group
activity was required to carry out many of the alleged rapes.
Furthermore, rape and sexual assault should be examined in the
context of the practice of ``ethnic cleansing'', which is discussed
in paragraphs 129 to
150 and the practices in detention camps
discussed in paragraph 230. When viewed in these contexts, it is
clear that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions occurred, as
did other violations of international humanitarian law. *72
Owing to the large scale of victimization that has taken
place over a substantial portion of the territories of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1991, there is a significant number of
persons who have been buried in many individual and mass graves.
The Commission addressed the question of mass graves in its
second interim report of 6 October 1993 (S/26545, annex) and
outlined its plans for the continuation of the database study and
the exhumation at Ovcara (Sector East Croatia) (see paras. 265
- 276)
and Packracka Poljana (Sector West Croatia) (see paras. 277 -
284).
As of 31 March 1994, the Commission received information
leading to the identification of 187 mass grave sites throughout
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. *74 Of the reported sites,
143 are located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 44 are in Croatia.
The number of bodies in reported mass graves ranges from 3
persons to 5,000 persons. Of the mass grave sites, 65 are believed
to contain at least some Muslims; 32 are believed to contain at
least some Croats; and 19 are believed to contain at least some
Serbs. Regarding the remainder of the grave sites, reports on
approximately 81 do not contain information regarding
ethnicity. Some grave sites are reported to contain bodies from
more than one warring faction. *75 However, these numbers do not
reflect whether the grave sites contain bodies of civilians and
other non-combatants or the bodies of soldiers killed in combat.
The number of bodies said to be contained in the reported
grave sites
are as follows: 25 grave sites contain less than 10 bodies; 16
grave sites contain at least 10 to 20 bodies; 29 grave sites
contain at least 20 to 50 victims; 22 grave sites contain at least
50 to 100 bodies; 20 grave sites contain at least 100 to 500
bodies; and 13 grave sites contain 500 bodies or more. Sixty-two
of the sites did not have a specific number of bodies.
Persons buried in 81 of the reported grave sites are
alleged to have been killed by Serbs; 16 of the sites contain
individuals reportedly killed by Croats; and 5 contain bodies
reportedly killed by Muslims. The remainder of the reports on 87
mass graves do not identify the ethnicity of the perpetrator.
Again, it should be noted that the individual or faction that was
responsible for the killing may not have been responsible for the
creation of the mass grave. *76
Many alleged mass graves are situated at or near the sites
of identified detention facilities. In the Prijedor region alone,
there are approximately 62 grave sites, some of which are said to
contain the remains
of prisoners killed at Omarska Camp, Keraterm Camp, and other camps
located in the area. The Brcko area, where the Luka Camp was
located, may contain between 5 and 10 mass grave sites. Grave
sites are also clustered in Foca, Mostar, Kotor Varos, Pakracka
Poljana (see paras. 277 -
284) and Marino Selo.
At least 99 of the alleged mass grave sites appear to
contain victims
of mass killings. In these instances, the source of information
clearly detailed the circumstances of the killing or provided
witness testimony. *77 Thus, as more information becomes
available, this number may change. In addition, the number of
graves which allegedly contain at least 20 bodies,
along with much of the source information regarding how many of the
grave sites were created, suggests that this number will increase.
This is particularly true at those sites which were at or near
detention facilities. The data, including witness statements,
indicate that many of those buried in mass graves were former
prisoners in the various detention facilities throughout the territory.
It should be noted that, as indicated above, the existence
of mass graves does not necessarily mean that persons were
unlawfully killed. However, there are several provisions of the
Geneva Conventions which outline the treatment and burial of those
killed during wartime. In some instances,
these provisions may have been violated by those burying the dead
in collective graves without proper identification. *78 Thus, a
mass grave may be important not only as a potential repository of
evidence of a mass killing, but the method and manner by which the
grave is created may itself be a war crime.
The Commission believes that it is particularly significant
to investigate mass graves in order to help resolve the problem of
missing persons. *79 This is of vital importance to their
families. Investigations of mass graves will also help to discover
evidence of criminality.
If the existence of the numerous mass graves situated at or
near identified detention facilities were to be confirmed, such
confirmation would be relevant to the inquiry into ``ethnic
cleansing'' (see paras. 129 -
150).
As indicated in its first and second interim reports, the
Commission had been intending for some time to conduct an
investigation of the Ovcara grave site in Sector East, which was
reported to contain the bodies of about 200 persons who were in the
Vukovar Hospital in November 1991 when the city fell to Serb
forces. The investigation would involve the exhumation of the
bodies contained in the mass grave site, the collection of physical
evidence at the grave site, the transport of the bodies to a morgue
facility, the autopsy examination of the bodies to establish
identification and the cause/manner of death and, in time, the
collection of other types of evidence, including testimonial
evidence, so that criminal responsibility for the killings related
to the bodies in the grave could be determined.
The Commission faced some logistical difficulties in
preparing for the Ovcara investigation. However, all of these
difficulties were eventually overcome and the Commission obtained
the assistance of an international team of investigators.
The only obstacle which the Commission could not overcome
was political - obtaining viable assurances and permissions from
the political authorities controlling the areas.
In an effort to obtain the necessary political assurances,
the Commission made visits to Vukovar in March, July, October and
November; to Belgrade in March and April; and to Knin in May,
September and October. In addition, the Commission exchanged
numerous pieces of correspondence with various authorities in these
locations. The approach taken by the Commission
was that, as a matter of balance, the Commission would attempt to
excavate a second mass grave site in Sector West that was believed
to contain Serb victims at essentially the same time as it
conducted the Ovcara excavation. The Commission and the local
authorities at various times also discussed issues, including the
location for post mortem examinations, the presence of
observers during the investigation, and the concerns of ``Serb
Republic of Krajina'' officials about the use of Sector West by
Croatian authorities as a site for radioactive waste disposal.
Following a meeting at Knin with the administration of the
``Serb Republic of Krajina'' on 5 September 1993, it was the view of
the Commission
that it had obtained the necessary approvals in writing to conduct
the Ovcara excavation. As a matter of balance, while the bodies at
Ovcara were being exhumed and an autopsy examination was being
conducted to establish identification and the cause/manner of
death, a preliminary site survey would be conducted at a presumed
mass gravesite in the Pakracka Poljana/Marino Selo area in Sector
West and a preliminary radiological survey would also be
conducted in Sector West. On the basis of this understanding, the
Commission decided to send an investigative mission to Zagreb in
early October and to Sectors West and East during the week of 17
October.
On 14 and 15 October, the Commission met with the
administration of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' at Knin to obtain
additional written
authorization to proceed with the Ovcara excavation and to address
newly raised concerns of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' about the
location of the morgue facility. The authorities of the ``Serb
Republic of Krajina'' insisted that post-mortem examinations could
not be conducted in Croatia. Although the Commission had intended
to have the post-mortem examinations conducted at Zagreb, the
Commission agreed to endeavour to locate a place for these
examinations which would be acceptable to the administration of the
``Serb Republic of Krajina''. The Commission also agreed to the
presence of observers of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' at the
sites during the investigations. On receipt of this assurance, the
administration of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' issued several
documents providing cooperation and authorizing the Commission to
proceed with the investigation.
The teams were deployed from Zagreb to Sector East on 19
October. On arrival in Sector East on the evening of 19 October,
the on-site rapporteur was informed by UNPROFOR that a meeting with
Sector East administration of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'', in
particular Colonel Milanovic, was a condition precedent to
commencement of the excavation. In the interim, and
with the acquiescence of the UNPROFOR Sector Commander, the various
teams went to the Ovcara site on 20 and 21 October to conduct a
second site survey, which would not involve any excavation. The
site had been secured by UNPROFOR since it was originally
identified in December 1992. During the site survey, the site was
checked for unexploded ordinance by UNPROFOR; brush
was cleared; the area was surveyed in detail with a range of
equipment; and a certain amount of physical evidence, including
spent cartridge cases and some cloth, was recovered.
On 22 October, the representatives of the Commission met
with Colonel Milanovic in Erdut and was informed that,
notwithstanding the various
approvals received at Knin on 14 and 15 October, the Parliament of
the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' had taken a decision on 21 October
requiring the Commission to postpone all activity at Ovcara until
a political solution was found to the situation in the former
Yugoslavia. Following the meeting, all
personnel were withdrawn from the Ovcara site to their
accommodations at Klissa and Erdut. After consultation with
UNPROFOR, it was decided that any attempt to continue the project
after this decision by the ``local administration'' would expose the
project personnel and UNPROFOR personnel to an excessive degree of
risk.
Although efforts were made to rehabilitate the Ovcara
project in the ensuing weeks, including a Commission meeting with
Mr. Bjegovic, Prime Minister of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' at
Knin on 30 October, none of these efforts were successful. No one
affiliated with the Commission has returned to the site, which
remains under UNPROFOR protection, since 22 October.
In order to make the most effective use of project
personnel, once it became apparent by midday on 24 October that
there would be no rapid change of position on the part of the local
administration, project personnel were shifted over a period of
time from Sector East to Sector West and elsewhere.
The last person and the last piece of equipment was out of Sector
East by 30 October. Sufficient material and personnel resources
were, however, retained in Croatia until about 10 November so that
the Ovcara excavation could be conducted if adequate political
approval was obtained. After 10 November, the onset of cold
weather made the project impracticable before the spring of 1994.
Appropriate political approval was not obtained before 10 November.
On 17 November 1993, the representatives of the Commission
met with Mr. Hadzic, President of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'',
at his initiative at Erdut. Also at the meeting were Mr. Niksic,
``Vice-Chairman of the Regional Council'', and Colonel Milanovic,
Deputy Minister of Defence of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina''. Note
no. 1-234-93, dated 16 November, was presented to
the on-site rapporteur, under the signature of Mr. Hadzic, stating
that the following decisions had been reached:
- The authorities of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' agreed to
cooperate in and give their approval for the excavations on the
site of Ovcara, in the municipality of Vukovar;
- The excavation activities could start in March or April the
following year, when the weather conditions improved;
- The authorities of the ``Serb Republic of Krajina'' would
appoint one member to observe the activities of the Commission;
- The ``President of the Republic'', Mr. Hadzic, had approved
the above-stated items and was willing to cooperate fully with the
Commission.
Owing to weather conditions, the Commission had to postpone
resumption of the investigation until the spring of 1994. In so
far as the Commission's work was terminated as of 30 April, all
relevant documents for this investigation have now been passed on
to the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal.
The site remains under UNPROFOR protection, but no criminal
investigation related to this mass grave excavation has been
conducted to date.
During the March 1993 reconnaissance mission, the
Commission became aware of the need to conduct a second mass grave
excavation at a site, which would probably contain Serb bodies, at
essentially the same time as the Ovcara excavation, which would
probably be found to contain Croatian bodies. At the same time, it
was informed of a number of probable clandestine grave
sites near Pakracka Poljana in Sector West, which were believed to
contain a large number of Serb bodies. For reasons related to the
security of the sites and of potential witnesses, the Commission
avoided visiting the sites at that time.
In October 1993, when the Commission was in a position to
conduct a mass grave excavation, it decided to have Physicians for Human
Rights conduct a preliminary site survey at Pakracka Poljana to
confirm the existence of a mass grave. At the time this decision
was taken, it was considered that the Pakracka Poljana location was
the location in the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) most
likely to be the site of a mass grave containing Serb victims.
From 20 October to 9 November 1993, the Commission deployed
teams to the area. The numbers of members of each group varied
over time, as persons were shifted from the Ovcara site to Pakracka
Poljana.
The Commission received a particularly high level of
support from UNPROFOR during this investigation.
The forensic report on this preliminary site investigation
reached the following conclusions:
- Nineteen individuals (16 males, 3 females) were buried in
nine separate graves in a field south of Pakracka Poljana. The graves
were shallow and appeared to have been dug by hand. Leaves found
in the bottom of some graves and the clothing on several
individuals, including heavy jackets and sweaters, suggests that
burials took place in the autumn or early winter;
- The area around the graves was used as an execution site.
Expended 22-calibre, .25-calibre, 9mm-calibre and 7.62 x 39mm-calibre
cartridge cases were found adjacent to six of the graves. Expended
rounds were also found near some of the bodies or recovered from
clothing. Five of the bodies had their hands tied with rope.
Other bodies had their hands together, sometimes in extremely
awkward positions, but no rope was found during the excavations.
It is possible that the hands had been bound but that the binding
was made of natural fibre that disintegrated. Fifteen of the bodies
exhibited gunshot wounds to the head, two had blunt head trauma,
one had multiple gunshot wounds to the arm and leg and one had
massive head trauma;
- The nine graves are clandestine burials. The isolated
location of the graves suggests that the executioners intended to bury their
victims secretly. The graves were within a short distance of a
road that could be accessed by a truck or other vehicle. The
graves were also adjacent to large, woody vegetation that screened
the area from at least one direction;
- There was no indication that the graves had been disturbed
since the time of internment.
Although the Pakracka Poljana site was believed to be the
site of mass graves containing up to 1,700 bodies, the site was
examined with considerable care. Seventy-one holes were dug at the site. The
very firmly based conclusion was reached that this belief was
erroneous.
On 9 November 1993, the 19 exhumed bodies were placed in
body bags together with preservative chemicals and reburied at a
site immediately adjacent to an UNPROFOR observation post. Before this step was
taken, some consideration was given to the possibility of
conducting an autopsy examination of the bodies to establish
identification and the cause/manner of death and to the possibility
of gathering some additional ante-mortem information by
interviewing selected persons in the area. These activities were
not undertaken owing to previously expressed ``Serb Republic of
Krajina'' concerns that post-mortems not be done in Croatia on account of the
difficulty of obtaining a suitable morgue facility. Also, time and
personnel resources would not permit the intensive effort required
to conduct a criminal investigation and to gather all available
ante-mortem information.
Responsibility for obtaining additional information and for
continuing this investigation has now been passed to the Office of
the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.
In determining the extent of the destruction of cultural
property in the former Yugoslavia, the Commission proceeded under
its overall plan of work and made use more particularly of its
database and reports by international organizations, including the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and
other intergovernmental sources and non-governmental organizations.
The Commission has received extensive information on
destruction of cultural property, but it was not in a position to
investigate all these allegations. In particular, it could not
verify allegations that all Catholic churches and mosques in Serb-
occupied territories of Bosnia had been
systematically destroyed or damaged. Since the Commission could
not consider, let alone investigate, all allegations of damage to
cultural property, *81 it has selected two examples which are
typical of such breaches.
The two examples chosen by the Commission were the battle
of Dubrovnik (see paras. 298 - 301) and the destruction of the Mostar
Bridge.
In the autumn of 1991, the region of Dubrovnik was
surrounded and besieged by the Yugoslav National Army. After a few
weeks, Dubrovnik itself was cut off by land and sea by the forces
of the former Yugoslavia. This
situation continued up to the autumn of 1992, when the district of
Dubrovnik was recognized as forming part of the Republic of
Croatia. The military occupation of the district of Dubrovnik
captured international attention because of the cultural and
historical significance of the region and the town. Dubrovnik is
now known as an old town which has suffered great damage as a
result of the Serbian attacks. In 1979, the old town had been
included in UNESCO's list of the world's cultural heritage.
The attacks on Dubrovnik started with the Serbian paramilitary
forces, supported by Yugoslavia's regular army, in June and August
On 1 October 1991 the Yugoslav Army invaded the district of Dubrovnik
and laid siege to the town. It may be affirmed that there was
virtually no defence of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area against
the Yugoslav forces. Thus the destruction could on no account be
justified as a military necessity.
The siege of Dubrovnik lasted from October until December.
The first shelling began on 1 October and continued sporadically
until 24 October 1991. After a short lull, the shelling started up
again on 30 October and continued into December. The shelling on 6
December 1991 was especially intensive. The shelling was selective
and deliberately aimed at the buildings in the old town and there
is no doubt that the destruction of cultural property was
intentional. However, the people doing the firing did not only hit
the old town. The new town was also hit.
According to estimates, 55.9 per cent of the buildings of the
old town were affected, either by fires or by damage to the
structures and special elements or to the facades and roofs.
Several palaces had their roofs either
destroyed or burned, including the Festival Palace, whose archives
were completely destroyed, and a number of monuments whose roofs
caved in. Other examples are St. Blaise's Church, the Franciscan
Cathedral and Convent, the Dominican Convent, St. Clair's Convent
and the Fountain of Onofrio; and, of course, there was the
destruction of the roofs of the old town. In this respect, the
local authorities list 336 direct hits and 254 cases of partial
destruction of roofs by shell fragments.
From the UNESCO experts' assessment, the total damaged roof
areas can be estimated at 56,747 m2. To this visible damage, the
experts of the Commission have added damage resulting from
vibrations, which may appear later, as well as the damage which
simply could not be detected at the time
the UNESCO experts were carrying out their work.
Thus, in respect of the statute of the International
Tribunal, the offences in Dubrovnik can be said to concern
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified
by military necessity and seizure or destruction and damage to
religious institutions dedicated to charity,
education, the arts and sciences as well as historic monuments and
artistic and scientific works.
The concept of military objective should also be considered
in this connection in order to shed light on the crimes committed.
Indeed, it seems quite clear that this destruction of cultural
property did not in any way
contribute to the military action and could in no way be considered
necessary in terms of the military objectives pursued. Nor is
there any way that the perpetrators of these crimes can claim to
have been utilizing the monuments for military purposes. In the
Commission's view, other concepts in addition to military
objectives should be applied: the concepts of undefended place
or object, of proportionality and of neutrality.
At 10.16 a.m. on 9 November 1993, Mostar Bridge was
destroyed. In this connection, the Institute for the Protection of
the Historic and Natural Cultural Heritage of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has accused the Croatian Defence Council and the
Croatian Army in a letter to UNESCO dated 10 November 1993.
This letter and other documents attached to the present report
describe the history of the bridge, which was built between 1557
and 1566 according to the plans of the Turkish architect Aerudin.
It is a monument which, unfortunately, did not appear in the UNESCO
list. However, this bridge was
well known to the population in the region, whether Serbian,
Croatian or Muslim. Moreover, the bridge was a symbol of Bosnia
and Herzegovina which connected the gap between the Muslim and
Croat communities. It embodied the links which united these
peoples in spite of their religious differences and the
circumstances of the present war. There can be no doubt, however,
that it was of greater value to the Muslims.
Admittedly, before it was destroyed, the bridge had already
suffered a certain amount of damage. Indeed, damage had already
been done to its northern parapets. But, all things considered,
the damage had been minor. The initial objective, it would seem,
had been to discourage people from
using it. Thus, prior to November 1993, the primary target had
been the parapet, forcing anyone who might be tempted to cross the
bridge to refrain from doing so. However, the shelling on 8
November 1993 clearly aimed at destroying the bridge. This
destruction was carried out by tanks belonging apparently to the
Croatian forces. On 9 November, the shelling continued. It was
then that the supporting arch of the southern end of the bridge was
hit and collapsed. It would seem that this incident was filmed by
Folio Productions (a British production company).
The same criminal characterization which applies to the
battle of Dubrovnik also applies to the destruction of Mostar
Bridge, which was also devoid of any military significance. It
would seem that the Croats were at
the origin of the destruction of Mostar Bridge. A Mostar district
military tribunal reportedly interrogated three Croatian Defence
Council soldiers, who allegedly acted, according to a statement by
the tribunal, ``on their own initiative, without orders from their
superiors''. *82 Clearly, these are questions of fact which have to
be decided judicially to determine both individual responsibility
and command responsibility.
The Commission sent an investigative team of Canadian and
Norwegian military lawyers and a French art historian to Dubrovnik
for the period 20 October to 4 November 1993. The objective of the investigation
was to prepare a law of armed conflict study of the battle of
Dubrovnik which would attempt, among other things:
- To determine whether and when indiscriminate attacks or
deliberate attacks on civilian persons or civilian objects
occurred;
- To quantify the loss of civilian life, injury to civilian
persons, and damage to civilian property, including cultural
property;
- To attribute responsibility for apparent violations of the
law of armed conflict.
On the basis of this investigation, the Commission finds
that at least 82, and possibly as many as 88, civilians were killed
as a result of JNA military operations in the district of Dubrovnik
during the period from September 1991 until December 1992,
inclusive, and that most of these persons
were killed in 1991. Thirteen civilians were killed during the St.
Nicholas Day bombardment of 6 December 1991. The Institute for the
Restoration of Dubrovnik has completed a study of damage to housing
in the district of Dubrovnik which the Commission accepts. The
Institute estimates that the
cost of reconstructing housing alone will be DM 69,000,000, while
the cost of complete reinstallation of families will be DM
480,000,000 (prices on 31 December 1990). Detailed reports on
damage to cultural property have been prepared by UNESCO, the
Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments and the Natural
Environment of Dubrovnik and the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe which the Commission has accepted as a basis
for their investigation. These reports indicate in particular that
a substantial amount of damage was caused to cultural property in
the old town of Dubrovnik, mostly during the St. Nicholas Day
bombardment.
It is the finding of the Commission that the St. Nicholas
Day bombardment of 6 December 1991 was a deliberate attack on civilian
persons and on civilian objects, including cultural property. It
is the finding of the Commission that it is possible to determine
the precise identity and status of persons killed or injured during
the bombardment and to confirm the extent of civilian property
damaged during the bombardment, the unit responsible for the
bombardment, the identity of the unit commander and the
identity and position in the chain of command of more senior
officers responsible for the bombardment.
It is the view of the Commission that it is possible to
develop prima facie cases directed against one or more officers
responsible for the St. Nicholas Day bombardment and that it may be
possible to develop cases
concerning other incidents in the district of Dubrovnik.
The disintegration of a federal State, as in the case of
the former Yugoslavia, is often at first a civil conflict.
However, as the respective States of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina declared their independence, received international
recognition and were admitted to
membership in the United Nations, the conflict with respect to each
of these States became an international conflict. *85 The first
interim report stated:
``45. The Commission is of the opinion, however, that the
character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned,
combined with the web of
agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have concluded
among themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the
law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety
of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.''
However, the precise time at which the different stages of
this multi-party conflict became or ceased to be a conflict of an
international character must be determined by a review of legally
relevant facts. This determination must be made by the
International Tribunal. In the event the Tribunal concludes that
the conflict is of an international character, the ``grave breaches''
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 shall apply,
as well as Additional Protocol I of 1977, as do other norms of
international humanitarian law. With respect to other periods,
common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II
apply, as do other norms of international humanitarian law.
The Commission emphasizes that the conventional and
customary international law norms on crimes against humanity and
genocide apply to the
entirety of this conflict. This is the case irrespective of
whether the conflict is determined to be of an international or
non-international character.
The Commission also concurs with respect to the provisions
of applicable law contained in the statute of the International
Tribunal. Indeed, in its first interim report (paras. 36-46), the Commission
had taken the position which the Security Council later adopted in
resolution 827 (1993). The Commission recognizes, however, that
Protocols I and II are also part of the applicable law.
Reports received and investigations conducted by the
Commission indicate that the level of victimization in this
conflict has been high. The crimes committed have been
particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution. *86 The
Commission has not been able to verify each report; however, the
magnitude of victimization is clearly enormous. *87
The Commission finds significant evidence of and
information about the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law
which have been communicated to the Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Tribunal.
Some of the conclusions relative to these violations are
reflected in the present report, but for obvious reasons
information and evidence of a prosecutorial nature are not
described herein.
The practices of ``ethnic cleansing'' (see paras.
129 - 150),
sexual assault and rape (see paras. 232 -
253 and 230) have been carried out
by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear
to be the product of a policy. The consistent failure to prevent
the commission of such crimes and the consistent failure to
prosecute and punish the perpetrators of these crimes, clearly
evidences the existence of a policy by omission. The consequence
of this conclusion is that command responsibility can be established.
Knowledge of these grave breaches and violations of
international humanitarian law can reasonably be inferred from
consistent and repeated practices.
The domestic criminal laws of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the criminal codes of all the republics
formerly comprising it contain prohibitions against the violations
that have taken place. Therefore, there should be no doubt in
anyone's mind that such acts as murder, torture, rape, robbery and
theft constitute crimes.
The observations set forth in paragraphs
110 to 127 on the
military structure of the warring factions and the strategies and
tactics they employ may reveal an initial state of confusion,
reducing the effectiveness of command and control. This apparent
confused state of affairs continued well beyond the initial stages
of the respective conflicts. This leads to the conclusion that the
existence of separate military structures and the
multiplicity of units may well have been intended by some of the
parties. The confusion may be intended to permit senior military
and political leaders to argue lack of knowledge of what was
happening and inability to control such unlawful conduct.
Notwithstanding the strong feelings of the warring factions
concerning their victimization, both historical and contemporary
arguments concerning reprisals (see paras. 63 -
66) and superior
orders (see paras. 61 and 62) do not constitute a defence under the
well-established law of international armed conflict and under the
national laws of the parties to the conflict.
The type, range and duration of the violations described in
the present report strongly imply command responsibility by
commission and omission and also indicate that the absolute defence
of obedience to superior orders is invalid and unfounded (ibid.).
This is particularly evident in view of the loose command and
control structure where unlawful orders could
have been disobeyed without individuals risking personal harm.
Indeed, some did. A moral choice usually existed. Individual
cases, however, will have to be judged on their respective merits
in accordance with the statute of the International Tribunal.
The Commission is shocked by the high level of
victimization and the
manner in which these crimes were committed, as are the populations
of all the parties to the conflict. The difference is that each
side sees only its own victimization, and not what their side has
done to others.
It is particularly striking to note the victims' high
expectations that this Commission will establish the truth and that
the International Tribunal will provide justice. All sides expect
this. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that peace in the future
requires justice, and that justice starts with establishing the
truth. *88 The Commission would be remiss if it
did not emphasize the high expectation of justice conveyed by the
parties to the conflict, as well as by victims, intergovernmental
organizations, non-governmental organizations, the media and world
public opinion. Consequently, the International Tribunal must be
given the necessary resources and support to meet these
expectations and accomplish its task. Furthermore, popular
expectations of a new world order based on the
international rule of law require no less than effective and
permanent institutions of international justice. The International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violation of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 must, therefore, be
given the opportunity to produce the momentum for this future
evolution.
The Commission requests the Secretary-General to publish
this report and its annexes in their entirety and to give them the
widest possible dissemination in order to inform Member States and
the interested public.
| Report Table of Contents | Part III to VI.D |
Footnotes
To return to the point of the text where you called the note, click on the
``return to text'' highlight
*55 See annex VIII. See also reports of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe: Report of the Thompson CSCE
mission to the detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see
S/24583); Report of the mission to
Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia (composed of Mr. H. Corell,
Mr. H. Tuerk and Ms. Gro Hillestad Thune) under the Moscow Human
Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE (30 September-5 October 1992).
return to text
*56 ICRC information on this subject has not been made
available to the Commission, as the ICRC deemed it to be
confidential.return to text
*57 Annex VIII contains details that support and amplify the
ensuing summary.return to text
*58 During a mission of the Commission to Tuzla, the medical
personnel of the hospital reported a large number of rapes, with
the victims ranging in
age from 5 to 81 years old. The Commission has not been able,
however, to verify these allegations.return to text
*59 See annexes IX and IX.A.return to text
*60 See E/CN.4/1993/50. The fears of victims are both real to
them and weigh heavily on their decision to speak out about their traumatic
victimization.return to text
*61 See annex IX. The figures reported below are approximate
because, notwithstanding careful scrutiny, some of the reported
incidents may be repeated.return to text
*62 In some reports, numbers are supplied instead of names to
protect the identity of the victims. However, the submitting party
has the true identity of the victim on file.return to text
*63 Other factors perhaps contributing to the correlation may
include: the fact that some mass movements of people involved in ``ethnic
cleansing'' had already occurred; or that mass media attention and
insensitive treatment of victims combined with ``fatigue'' among
victims resulted in a decline in the number of reported rapes.
Alternatively, the public simply became less interested in the
issue, and journalists stopped pursuing the stories.return to text
*64 The Commission met with a Sarajevo medical team concerned
with the care of rape victims and spoke with two teen-age rape
victims during its visit in April.return to text
*65 This investigation of rape and other sexual assaults was
conducted by the Commission with 11 teams of female lawyers (from
Finland, the United States, Canada, Bangladesh and Ireland), who
conducted interviews, and 8
female (and 2 male) mental health specialists (from the United
States), who worked to support the process. The professional
members of the teams volunteered their time to this investigation.
This is the first time that such an investigation has been
conducted in time of war by women seeking to determine the facts
about rape and other forms of sexual assault (see annex IX.A). It
is noteworthy that, notwithstanding the understandable fears and
apprehensions of the victims and witnesses, 223 of them voluntarily
agreed to speak to the Commission's team of interviewers. Every
member of the team first approached interviewees with expressions
of human solidarity and concern. Invariably to such traumatized
victims, the mere fact that a United Nations body tangibly
expressed its concern for them was comforting and uplifting.
Almost all interviewees expressed their appreciation to the
interviewers in the warmest ways. If nothing else, this unique
investigation brought some human comfort and support to these
victims. During the last few days of interviewing, the
Commission's field officers received an average of 15 calls a day
from victims and witnesses wanting to meet an interviewer.
Unfortunately, the investigation had to be concluded on 31 March,
because the Commission had to end its work on 30 April 1994. Phase
I of the investigation took place in Croatia. Phase II took place in third
countries, such as Slovenia and Austria. It was not possible to
conduct an investigation in the territory of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, as the Commission had requested from that
Government. Interviews which provided information about other
violations of international humanitarian law are dealt with in
other relevant chapters of the present report. Investigations
were also conducted in Austria and Sweden for the Commission, but
their results are not included in the present summary because of
special confidentiality considerations.return to text
*66 One victim reported an attempted rape in her home.
return to text
*67 This number does not include rapes witnessed by rape
victims themselves.return to text
*68 In addition to the cases of rape and sexual assault, the
interviews gathered important information regarding mass executions
and mass torture, particularly in the detention camp context.
return to text
*69 As stated in footnote 65 above, the Commission had the
opportunity to pursue further interviews in Croatia. In addition,
the Government of Turkey invited the Commission to conduct
interviews in that country. However, the Commission could not do
either, because it was required to conclude its work
by 30 April 1994.return to text
*70 The patterns have been identified for the purposes of
analysis only and, to some extent, they overlap. Thus, some cases
illustrate more than one pattern, while, on the other hand, not all
cases fall within these five
categories identified. The use of these interviews as
illustrations is not a definitive characterization of the type of
rape in question, as in some cases further investigation is needed.
return to text
*71 Out of the 514 allegations which are included in the
database, 327 occurred in places of detention.
return to text
*72 It should be noted that several victims have reported acts
of courage and generosity by Serbs who tried and at times succeeded
in saving and sparing victims from death, torture and rape. Such
acts should be acknowledged and recognized.
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*73 See annex X.
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*74 Multiple reports of graves containing different information
regarding location or number of bodies, while possibly involving
some duplication, have been included since there is no means of
ascertaining whether the reports refer to the same grave or
different ones.return to text
*75 For example, there are at least nine reported grave sites
in north-west Bosnia and Herzegovina which may contain both Muslim
and Croat victims. These grave sites are located in Brisevo,
Raljas, Stara Rijeka, Redak, Ljubija, Volaric, Jubovci, Biscani-
Sredice and the Kurevo Forest.
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*76 This would occur in an instance where two factions were
fighting one another, civilians were killed, and their neighbours
had no choice but to bury them in mass graves, owing to time,
sanitary or safety considerations.
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*77 Among these are: Ovcara, allegedly containing civilians
and wounded Croatian soldiers taken from the Vukovar Hospital (see
paras. 265 - 276);
Pakra ka Poljana, where the Commission found 19 bodies after
conducting investigations in October and November of 1993 (see
paras. 277 - 284) and Marino Selo, where the Commission has received
information regarding a mass grave containing as many as 2,500
bodies (see paras. 277 - 284 and annexes X, X.A, X.B).
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*78 First Geneva Convention, art. 17; Third Geneva Convention,
art. 120; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 129; Protocol I, art. 34.
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*79 For a more detailed discussion of the issue of missing
persons, see E/CN.4/1994/26/Add.1.
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*79a See annex X.B.return to text
*80 See annex X.B.
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*81 Other information on destruction of cultural property is
contained in annexes XI and XI.A. The battle and siege of Sarajevo
(paras. 183 -
193) and particularly annex VI reveal significant and
purposeful destruction of
cultural and religious monuments in Sarajevo.
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*82 Communique dated 22 September 1993 from the Zagreb Foreign
Press Bureau. The Commission considers that the Croatian Army
bears some responsibility in this matter.
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*83 See annex XI.A.
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*84 See annex XII.
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*85 See also, inter alia, the Advisory Opinion of
the Arbitration Commission of the European Communities' Conference on
the former Yugoslavia,
opinion No. 2, 11 January 1992; opinion No. 3, 11 January 1992;
opinion No. 4, 11 January 1992; opinion No. 5, 11 January 1992;
opinion No. 11, 11 January 1992.
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*86 The
sources of information are described in paras. 20 -
24.
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*87 The territory over which most of the victimization occurred
had a population base of an estimated 6 million persons, of whom
1.5 to 2 million are now refugees in more than 20 countries. Most
of them were deported or forced to leave and are unable to return.
The civilian and military casualties among all warring factions are
reported to exceed 200,000. The number of reported mass graves,
150, discussed in paras. 254 - 264, tends to
support the estimates of the number of casualties. Over 700 prison
camps and detention facilities are reported to have existed (see
paras. 216 - 231). The number of detainees and reports on mistreated
prisoners, in for example, the Prijedor area alone exceeds 6,000
(see paras. 151 - 182).
As stated in paragraph 153 concerning the
Prijedor area, ``the total number of killed and deported persons as
of June 1993 is 52,811''. The rape and sexual assault
study and investigation discussed in paragraphs 232 -
253 suggests a
very high number of rapes and sexual assaults in custodial and non-
custodial settings (see also para. 229). Thus, the earlier
projection of 20,000 rapes made by other sources are not
unreasonable considering the number of actual reported cases.
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*88 Establishing the truth is the best method of enhancing
deterrence. In fact, early investigation of the facts, in any
context of criminal activity, increases the effectiveness of future
prosecution. The combination of investigation and prosecution
makes deterrence more effective, thereby reducing possible
violations in the future. Without effective investigations
and prosecutions, the converse is true.
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| Report Table of Contents | Part III to VI.D |